Monografii︠a︡ posvi︠a︡shchena tvorchestvu Petra Evgenʹevicha Astafʹeva (1846-1893), zamechatelʹnogo russkogo filosofa, psikhologa i publit︠s︡ista iz plei︠a︡dy mysliteleĭ kont︠s︡a XIX veka -- "zolotogo veka" russkoĭ kulʹtury. V knige detalʹno rassmotreny osnovnye dostizhenii︠a︡ P.E. Astafʹeva, svi︠a︡zannye s obosnovaniem spiritualisticheskogo mirovozzrenii︠a︡: ego uchenie o dukhovnoĭ lichnosti i svobode voli, paradoksalʹnai︠a︡ traktovka chuvstva li︠u︡bvi, originalʹnai︠a︡ kont︠s︡ept︠s︡ii︠a︡ "bessoznatelʹnogo", predstavlenie o vere cheloveka v sebi︠a︡ kak pochve estestvennogo bogopoznanii︠a︡ i t.d. V edinstve s filosofsko-psikhologicheskim ucheniem P.E. Astafʹeva rassmotrena ego publit︠s︡istika (vkli︠u︡chai︠a︡ novyĭ i gluboko aktualʹnyĭ variant "troĭstvennoĭ (...) formuly") i namechena vozmozhnostʹ metafizicheskogo ponimanii︠a︡ nat︠s︡ionalʹnoĭ prirody cheloveka. V prilozhenii︠a︡ k knige vkli︠u︡cheny dva ėti︠u︡da avtora, posvi︠a︡shchennye poni︠a︡tii︠a︡m narodnosti i sobornosti. (shrink)

Nous examinons les conditions de vérité pour des attributions de savoir dans le cas des connaissances mathématiques. La disposition d’une démonstration formalisable semble être un critère naturel :(*) X sait que p est vrai si et seulement si X en principe dispose d’une démonstration formalisable pour p.La formalisabilité pourtant ne joue pas un grand rôle dans la pratique mathématique effective. Nous présentons des résultats d’une recherche empirique qui indiquent que les mathématiciens n’employent pas certaines spécifications de (*) quand ils attribuent (...) du savoir. De plus, nous montrons que le concept de savoir mathématique qui est à la base de l’emploi effectif du mot « savoir » de la pratique mathématique est tout à fait compatible avec certaines intuitions philosophiques mais apparaît comme différent des concepts philosophiques formant la base de (*). (shrink)

Nous examinons les conditions de vérité pour des attributions de savoir dans le cas des connaissances mathématiques. La disposition d’une démonstration formalisable semble être un critère naturel :(*) X sait que p est vrai si et seulement si X en principe dispose d’une démonstration formalisable pour p.La formalisabilité pourtant ne joue pas un grand rôle dans la pratique mathématique effective. Nous présentons des résultats d’une recherche empirique qui indiquent que les mathématiciens n’employent pas certaines spécifications de (*) quand ils attribuent (...) du savoir. De plus, nous montrons que le concept de savoir mathématique qui est à la base de l’emploi effectif du mot « savoir » de la pratique mathématique est tout à fait compatible avec certaines intuitions philosophiques mais apparaît comme différent des concepts philosophiques formant la base de (*). (shrink)

Background: Individuals with psychopathic traits demonstrate an attenuated emotional response to aversive stimuli. However, recent evidence suggests heterogeneity in emotional reactivity among individuals with psychopathic or callous-unemotional (CU) traits, the emotional detachment dimension of psychopathy. We hypothesize that primary variants of psychopathy will respond with blunted affect to negatively valenced stimuli, whereas individuals marked with histories of childhood trauma/maltreatment exposure, known as secondary variants, will display heightened emotional reactivity. To test this hypothesis, the present study examined fear-potentiated startle between psychopathy (...) variants while viewing aversive, pleasant, and neutral scenes. Method: 238 incarcerated adolescent (M age = 16.8, SD = 1.11 years) boys completed a picture-startle paradigm and self-report questionnaires assessing CU traits, antisocial-aggressive behavior, and maltreatment. Results: Latent profile analyses identified four classes; primary variants (high CU traits, high aggression, low maltreatment; n = 46), secondary variants (high CU traits, high aggression, high maltreatment; n = 42), and two nonpsychopathic groups differentiated on maltreatment experience (n = 148). Findings from an ANOVA comparing identified groups on startle amplitude difference scores (i.e., aversive-neutral) suggested a main effect for group, F(3,196)=8.91, p<.001, η2 = .12. Primary variants of juvenile psychopathy displayed reduced startle potentiation to aversive images (threat and victim scenes), whereas secondary variants distinguished by high levels of childhood maltreatment did not. Conclusions: Findings add to a rapidly growing body of literature supporting the possibility of multiple developmental pathways to psychopathy (i.e., equifinality), and extend it by finding support for divergent potential biomarkers between primary and secondary psychopathy variants. (shrink)

RESUMEN En el marco del Proyecto FONDECYT Nº 1100600, surge el interés por indagar acerca de la producción escrita en estudiantes chilenos con el fin de obtener una visión de la calidad de dicha producción. Motivados también por los resultados que los estudiantes obtuvieron en Comprensión Lectora, según el Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de la Educación (SIMCE), específicamente, porque estos no han sido muy alentadores, es razonable esperar que esta habilidad tenga una fuerte influencia en el desarrollo de (...) la composición por escrito. El presente estudio se enfoca en la calidad de escritos producidos por 137 estudiantes chilenos, considerando una secuencia narrativa y una explicativa (Adam, 2001), y el tipo de plantel educacional. Los participantes cursaban cuarto (n = 69) y octavo (n = 68) de enseñanza básica. La calidad de la escritura se midió con el instrumento Perfil del Escritor (Spalding & Cummins, 1998), cuyos descriptores derivan en tres niveles de calidad: alta, media y baja. Los resultados revelan una mayor calidad en la secuencia narrativa. Escasas secuencias narrativas se calificaron como de calidad alta. Los participantes calificados con el criterio más alto asistían al establecimiento de tipo particular subvencionado. En todos los establecimientos se observan secuencias de calidad baja. (shrink)

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Valentini searches for a unifying principle that underlies whatever genuine obligations we might have to obey the norms of any and all social practices, ranging from line queueing norms, through offsides rules in soccer, to obligations not to break the law. I argue that this search is driven, and distorted, by a commitment to what Bernard Williams labeled the ‘morality system’. Once we see this, we should question the value of the unifying project. Most (...) social norms can be considered on their own terms, as part of a rich and variegated ethical life, without subsuming them under the question of whether others’ moral rights are at stake. Similarly, political obligation needs to be understood in relation to the practical activity of politics, not as an abstract moral quandary. (shrink)

Exclusionary defeat is Joseph Raz’s proposal for understanding the more complex, layered structure of practical reasoning. Exclusionary reasons are widely appealed to in legal theory and consistently arise in many other areas of philosophy. They have also been subject to a variety of challenges. I propose a new account of exclusionary reasons based on their justificatory role, rejecting Raz’s motivational account and especially contrasting exclusion with undercutting defeat. I explain the appeal and coherence of exclusionary reasons by appeal to commonsense (...) value pluralism and the intermediate space of public policies, social roles, and organizations. We often want our choices to have a certain character or instantiate a certain value and in order to do so, that choice can only be based on a restricted set of reasons. Exclusion explains how pro tanto practical reasons can be disqualified from counting towards a choice of a particular kind without being outweighed or undercut. (shrink)

I argue that legitimacy discourses serve a gatekeeping function. They give practitioners telic standards for riding herd on social practices, ensuring that minimally acceptable versions of the practice are implemented. Such a function is a necessary part of implementing formalized social practices, especially including law. This gatekeeping account shows that political philosophers have misunderstood legitimacy; it is not secondary to justice and only necessary because we cannot agree about justice. Instead, it is a necessary feature of actual human social practices, (...) which must be implemented via practitioners' discretion in changing contexts. (shrink)

The essays collected in this special issue explore what legitimacy means for actors and institutions that do not function like traditional states but nevertheless wield significant power in the global realm. They are connected by the idea that the specific purposes of non-state actors and the contexts in which they operate shape what it means for them to be legitimate and so shape the standards of justification that they have to meet. In this introduction, we develop this guiding methodology further (...) and show how the special issue’s individual contributions apply it to their cases. In the first section, we provide a sketch of our purpose-dependent theory of legitimacy beyond the state. We then highlight two features of the institutional context beyond the state that set it apart from the domestic case: problems of feasibility and the structure of international law. (shrink)

Political legitimacy is best understood as one type of a broader notion, which I call institutional legitimacy. An institution is legitimate in my sense when it has the right to function. The right to function correlates to a duty of non-interference. Understanding legitimacy in this way favorably contrasts with legitimacy understood in the traditional way, as the right to rule correlating to a duty of obedience. It helps unify our discourses of legitimacy across a wider range of practices, especially including (...) the many evaluations we increasingly make of international institutions of various sorts, but also including domestic institutions. (shrink)

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with (...) others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience. (shrink)

By appeal to the phenomenon of presupposition accommodation, Rae Langton and others have proposed that speakers can gain genuine authority over their audiences when they implicitly claim such autho...

Institutions undertake a huge variety of constitutive purposes. One of the roles of legitimacy is to protect and promote an institution’s pursuit of its purpose; state legitimacy is generally understood as the right to rule, for example. When considering legitimacy beyond the state, we have to take account of how differences in purposes change legitimacy. I focus in particular on how differences in purpose matter for the stringency of the standards that an institution must meet in order to be legitimate. (...) An important characteristic of an institution’s purpose is its deontic status, i.e. whether it is morally impermissible, merely permissible, or mandatory. Although this matters, it does so in some non-obvious ways; the mere fact of a morally impermissible purpose is not necessarily delegitimating, for example. I also consider the problem of conflicting, multiple, and contested institutional purposes, and the different theoretical roles for institutional purpose. Understanding how differences in purpose matter for an institution’s legitimacy is one part of the broader project of theorizing institutional legitimacy in the many contexts beyond the traditional context of the state. (shrink)

We attempt to clarify the main conceptual issues in approaches to ‘objectification’ or ‘measurement’ in quantum mechanics which are based on superselection rules. Such approaches venture to derive the emergence of classical ‘reality’ relative to a class of observers; those believing that the classical world exists intrinsically and absolutely are advised against reading this paper. The prototype approach (K. Hepp, Helv. Phys. Acta45 (1972), 237–248) where superselection sectors are assumed in the state space of the apparatus is shown to be (...) untenable. Instead, one should couple system and apparatus to an environment, and postulate superselection rules for the latter. These are motivated by the locality of any observer or other (actual or virtual) monitoring system. In this way ‘environmental’ solutions to the measurement problem (H.D. Zeh, Found. Phys.1 (1970), 69–76; W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev.D26 (1982), 1862–1880 and Progr. Theor. Phys.89 (1993), 281–312) become consistent and acceptable, too. Points of contact with the modal interpretation are briefly discussed. We propose a minimal value attribution to observables in theories with superselection rules, in which only central observables have properties. In particular, the eigenvector-eigenvalue link is dropped. This is mainly motivated by Ockham's razor. (shrink)

I argue for a new conception of practical authority based on an analysis of the relationship between authority and subject. Commands entail a demand for practical deference, which establishes a relationship of hierarchy and vulnerability that involves a variety of signals and commitments. In order for these signals and commitments to be justified, the subject must be under a preexisting duty, the authority’s commands must take precedence over the subject’s judgment regarding fulfillment of that duty, the authority must accept the (...) position and responsibilities of command, and the authority must be sufficiently trustworthy relative to how vulnerable the subject makes herself by deferring. This results in an instrumentalist conception of practical authority that can be favorably compared to Joseph Raz’s famous service conception. The relational conception’s main advantage is that it focuses on the authority as much as the subject, requiring that the authority accept responsibility for the relationship and be sufficiently trustworthy. (shrink)

Contrary to the widely accepted consensus, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that there are no pre-institutional judicial procedural rights. Thus commonly affirmed rights like the right to a fair trial cannot be assumed in the literature on punishment and legal philosophy as they usually are. Wellman canvasses and rejects a variety of grounds proposed for such rights. I answer his skepticism by proposing two novel grounds for procedural rights. First, a general right against unreasonable risk of punishment grounds rights to an (...) institutionalized system of punishment. Second, to complement and extend the first ground, I more controversially propose a right to provision of the robust good of security. People have a right to others' protecting for avoiding wrongfully harming them: when I take an action that is reasonably expected to threaten the protected interests of others, I must take appropriate care to avoid setting back those interests. Inflicting punishment on someone--intentionally harming them in response to a violation--is prima facie wrongful, so I can only count as taking appropriate care in punishing when I follow familiar procedures that reliably and redundantly test whether they are liable to such punishment, i.e. whether they have forfeited their right against punishment through a culpable act. (shrink)

Courts and jurors sometimes refuse to assign liability to defendants on the basis of statistics alone, despite their apparent reliability. I argue that this refusal is best understood as a recognition of defendants’ right to security. Understood as a robust good in Philip Pettit’s sense, security requires that someone risking harm to others’ protected interests adopt a disposition of concern that controls against wrongfully harming them. Since trials risk harm, the state must adopt such a disposition. Statistics leave open the (...) possibility of innocence and so wrongful harm in a way that the state cannot ignore; if it does use such statistics, it makes defendants wrongfully insecure. This explanation of the problem of bare statistical evidence is especially apt because security grounds the right to a fair trial and judicial procedural rights more generally. (shrink)

We propose a technical reformulation of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics, which is based on the postulate that the final state of a measurement is classical; this accords with experimental practice as well as with Bohr’s views. Unlike the usual formulation (in which the post-measurement state is a unit vector in Hilbert space), our version actually opens the possibility of admitting a purely technical solution within the confines of conventional quantum theory (as opposed to solutions that either modify this (...) theory, or introduce unusual and controversial interpretative rules and/or ontologies).To that effect, we recall a remarkable phenomenon in the theory of Schrödinger operators (discovered in 1981 by Jona-Lasinio, Martinelli, and Scoppola), according to which the ground state of a symmetric double-well Hamiltonian (which is paradigmatically of Schrödinger’s Cat type) becomes exponentially sensitive to tiny perturbations of the potential as ħ→0. We show that this instability emerges also from the textbook wkb approximation, extend it to time-dependent perturbations, and study the dynamical transition from the ground state of the double well to the perturbed ground state (in which the cat is typically either dead or alive, depending on the details of the perturbation).Numerical simulations show that adiabatically arising perturbations may (quite literally) cause the collapse of the wave-function in the classical limit. Thus, at least in the context of a simple mathematical model, we combine the technical and conceptual virtues of decoherence (which fails to solve the measurement problem but launches the key idea that perturbations may come from the environment) with those of dynamical collapse models à la grw (which do solve the measurement problem but are ad hoc), without sharing their drawbacks: single measurement outcomes are obtained (instead of merely diagonal reduced density matrices), and no modification of quantum mechanics is needed. (shrink)

Pekakak adalah salah satu tokoh yang memiliki pengetahuan mendalam dan perencanaan yang cermat. Saat fajar menyingsing, ia terlihat bertengger di atas pohon. Dengan kemampuan sempurna untuk mengontrol kecepatan penerbangan miliknya, seperti kapan harus memperlambat atau mempercepat, dia dapat dengan mudah menghitung cara optimal untuk menangkap ikan.

Constituent power is an idea with a long tradition in modern political thought but has been largely abandoned since the middle of the twentieth century. Here I offer a new account of constituent power that avoids problems of the classical account, including the paradox of constitutionalism, and clarifies how individuals contribute to creating their shared political order. I argue that constituent power should be understood as an individual power-with: the agential power to constitute a legal order with others. Our individual, (...) banal acts of law-abidingness each partially effect the collective outcome. We generally exercise constituent power unconsciously and automatically, guiding our actions to succeed as defined by law and relying on the legal system to take up our contributions and effectively combine them with others. (shrink)

In our day, the question of the nature of the scientific world view is of tremendous importance in people's practical activity. The views held in modern science at the present time constitute a most important element of world view as a whole, confirming the materialist nature of the universe and of man. The science of our times, having attained stupendous results in analysis of the laws of the microworld, the cosmos, and the essence of life, and in understanding human beings, (...) provides indisputable proof of the material nature of all things and phenomena. (shrink)

The problem of man is one of the most urgent of our day. Man is a product of history. His consciousness is shaped by the concrete historical experience of humanity. These principles of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on man have had the most substantive kind of confirmation in contemporary analysis of the problem of the relation between the social and the biological. In his biological features man is a part of nature. The social aspect has to do with his suprabiological sphere, (...) and is transmitted from generation to generation through different channels than the genetic information inscribed in molecules of DNA. (shrink)